It only appears to be paradoxical that the most likely among aestheticians to ignore the scientific work and evolutionary thinking on emotion are precisely those who can be regarded as descendants of the anti-rationalist theoretical strain in human thought that can be traced to dim antiquity, and certainly to classical Greece. Emotivism of sorts had proponents in the 18th century, for example, in David Hume, notably in his 1739 A Treatise of Human Nature, but it has thrived especially in the contemporary intellectual or, rather, anti-intellectual climate. In short, it is the emotivists, further encouraged by the current fashion of excessive sensitivity, who are most likely to ignore sound scientific findings about emotion, regarding them as too restrictive and constraining the emoting flights in which they wish to indulge. Moreover, as I shall show later, even when philosophical and psychological aestheticians with an emotivist proclivity attempt to discuss scientific emotion theory or to incorporate it into their work, these efforts are almost invariably cursory or misleading.
The plan of the paper is as follows: there are sections on emotivism, on the loci of emotion in visual art, and on a psychobiological view of emotion that is contrasted with some views in philosophical aesthetics. By far the longest section is a detailed critique of three representative studies in psychological aesthetics on the question of potential impact of visual art on emotion. I conclude the article by reaffirming that traditional visual art is not capable of inducing genuine emotions and instead argue in favor of the hypothesis that installations, which skillfully combine psychophysical, statistical, and classical-conditioning properties, are capable of inducing aesthetic awe, a component of my Aesthetic Trinity Theory, on which I have been doing work, including experimental, in the past decade. 3 
Emotivism
Since my chapter about emotion and reason in art-music composers' creative process (see Note 1) , I have in two other articles (Note 1) discussed emotivism as the currently prevalent position in the study of, and talk about, music (but not only music) and, more specifically, as the proclivity for excessive insertion of emotion and "feeling" into both scientific and lay accounts of mental life, needs, and motivation in daily behavior, in matters artistic (especially musical) and non-artistic. 4 In contrast to the emotivist attitude, I have argued for the paramount importance of contemplation, analytical and technical skills, problem-solving and planning -in short, reason -as the key features of art-music composers' (including contemporary ones) daily work, especially when developing large-scale pieces (but not limited to these); and I suggested that the role of acute emotional states induced by life-events was minimal and indirect.
Nevertheless, emotivism pervades much talk about music, from pop-psychology accounts to scholarly discourse.
Because it seems likely that these observations are valid with regard to visual art also, emotivism is mentioned early in this article -primarily as an insufficiently recognized backdrop for a number of contemporary debates in aesthetics. Somewhat paradoxically, it seems to be a cognitive stance taken by many philosophical and psychological aestheticians, one that reflects their unwarranted, opportunistic acceptance of a quasi-ideological cultural context that has been characterized as deeply antiintellectual. This current context may further augment the already strong anti-rationalist, anti-cognitivist, neo-early-Humean views shared by certain aestheticians of visual art.
Where are the loci of "emotion" in visual art?
Without resorting to hyperbole, one can say that writing about emotion in the domain of visual art appears to inspire aestheticians, art theorists and critics, and especially artists, to far-fetched -often wildly romanticizing -claims, and also to a frequent reliance on dubious "folk knowledge," thesis substitution, and, generally, imprecision. 5 Not just in comparison to claims made for music, but in and of themselves, such ideas often ring false. For this reason, a list of the loci of "emotion" in visual art will be provided in this section and it will be done, for the most part, without concrete attribution. To readers who may think that the list is too elementary, my response is that I agree but that the chosen manner of presentation is dictated by the vagueness and imprecision in many otherwise reputable sources. In this analysis, it is useful to regard the referential-abstract continuum of expressive works as having an analogue in formalist works, with the formalist-expressive dimension itself a continuum -which, in Figure 1 human life, they therefore must -somehow! -also constitute an important part of the response to whatever aesthetic visual stimulus an author is discussing.
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As was the case with Martin, data by themselves continue, over a hundred years later, not to be able to impose sufficient discipline on psychological emotivists (experimenters as well as journal reviewers). 10 In addition to the expectations that were mentioned above, which are likely to be based on the prevalent emotivist fashion and pseudo-explanatory theoretical convenience, there is in most contemporary psychology departments an incentive to link one's area of research (especially when it is thought to be "soft") with biological, evolutionary processes of which emotions are clearly an example.
A psychobiological view of emotion and some contrasting views in philosophical aesthetics
The following view can be legitimately offered as representing a relatively commonly held, mainstream, psychobiological view of emotion:
Along with mind and behavior, emotion is one of the key concepts in psychobiology. Because the fundamental emotions -anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and perhaps only a couple of others -guide and energize behavior in crucial life situations, those with enormous biological consequences, they have been subjected to considerable selective and adaptive evolutionary pressures. Emotions are psychologically, physiologically, and metabolically "costly" and thus reserved for emergencies; when they do occur, they are major events in human phenomenology. The key attributes of the basic emotions are that numerous bodily systems are involved, simultaneously and in tandem; that they are acute, occurring in "episodes," with feedback loops; highly pronounced; readily identifiable and reportable by the experiencer; that they flood consciousness and are pan-cultural in terms of experience and expression; and that they have an unambiguous cause or object. They are to be distinguished from moods (such as elation, despondence, serenity), drives (hunger, sex), traits or dispositions (e.g., anxiety, introversion, generosity), and attitudes (hostility, tolerance, etc.).
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The above position needs to be contrasted with the views of some leading philosophers-aestheticians who have written at length about emotion. Peter Goldie's account is broad, but uncritically over-inclusive, and occasionally imprecise to the extent that would seldom be encountered in purely philosophical discourse. 12 Both Goldie and Jerrold Levinson are on especially slippery ground when discussing the idea of "aesthetic emotions" -in which they are joined by some psychologists, such as Leder and Marcel
Zentner. Briefly, because of their insufficient consideration of externally and internally oriented appraisal, and the monitoring and integration of information from physiological processes, these philo-and psycho-aestheticians find themselves having to accept the existence of literally hundreds of "emotions" -in fact, any conceivable "state" for which there is a word in a language (and, to some extent, different "states" in different languages). 13 A special case regarding appraisal are the views of philosophers who favor the idea of noncognitive theories of emotion and, specifically, of "unconscious emotions." 14 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for philosophers to introduce, on an ad hoc basis, without preparation or definition, fuzzy common-language terms, which are then used for theoretical purpose: examples, from Noël Carroll, an otherwise scientifically-minded philosopher, are "feeling," "feeling-charged," "feeling-toned" -and in this he has been joined by Levinson. 15 With regard to his own position on emotions being induced in viewers by visual art, Levinson is evasive -and with regard to the effects of abstract art completely silent.
For example, in the 1998 article that I cited, Levinson opens section 4 by raising the problem of how absolute music, and a "minimalist sculpture or Abstract Expressionist painting" can produce emotional responses. He then devotes the remainder of the section to discussing the possible mechanisms by which absolute music can induce emotion, but does not return to abstract art even to suggest a single possible mechanism; nor does he do that in the remaining two sections of the article. 16 It could, I suppose, be argued that I have to some extent eliminated the mentioned philosophers' positions (including Paul Guyer's in Note 2) by definitional fiat concerning emotion. However, to put it bluntly, scholarship and, in the case of emotion, science, cannot advance in a common-language quagmire without well-considered definitions defended by sound data.
A critique of selected psycho-aesthetic work on the question of potential impact of visual art on emotion
In this section, I shall examine a number of issues that are relevant when contemplating the effect of visual art on emotion. The psycho-aesthetic work chosen for scrutiny illustrates problems that can be found in other studies. In some cases, the voice of philosophical aestheticians can be heard as the background of the empirical work.
1. extends her right hand in the shape of a claw, while her left hand grasps a bag of money.
Coming from her mouth is a serpent that has turned round and is about to bite her eye." seconds at the beginning of the session. 19 In addition, each of the images, accompanied by its name, was showed to participants for a full minute. heterogeneous processes, events, and states, there is "continuous affective evaluation." It is not specified whether the object of "affective evaluation" is the artwork or the self. Be that as it may, out of the "affective state" box out pops "aesthetic emotion."
Unlike the case of the other main outcome, "aesthetic judgment," which is better prepared, "aesthetic emotion" seems to be an unjustified add-on that was forced by habit and the prevalent emotivism. Nowhere in the article do Leder et al. acknowledge that the idea of aesthetic emotions is a highly controversial one in the published record (especially in the psychology and philosophy of music) or seem to recognize the strangeness of this notion from the perspective of psychobiological emotion theory.
Confusing a careful reader, the authors oscillate in their presentation between a viewer in a laboratory experiment and one in a naturalistic situation, such as a museum.
There are numerous puzzling, undefended, and, for lack of a better term, naive statements, such as: "We [assume] that the typical affective state when entering an art (even though the cited authors carefully never used the term "emotion"), and in whose experiment "the emotional state of the participants was a good predictor for ratings of pleasantness," when, in fact, no such ratings were collected. Turning now to what the study authors had to say about the differences between the experimental and control participants, one observes that their main goal was to demonstrate that wearing a glove did not interfere with the experience. They found this and, unfortunately, more -namely that wearing a glove made the museum visit significantly more "inspiring" and more "interesting" than not wearing one. This finding (also old and sociological), without the authors acknowledging it and recognizing the adverse inferential implications, clearly demonstrates a major possible source of confounding of the physiological data also. People love being selected, especially for a scientific, "bio-electronic" study, and one would expect analogous enjoyment differences between the study's control sample and an unselected sample.
Turning now to the evaluative and physiological results that are meant to demonstrate the emotional impact of the artworks, one observes the following weaknesses in the findings and the argumentation:
A. Evaluations of the "emotional" aspects of the artworks were given during the exit interview, long after viewing, and are thus of limited reliability. As for the statistical principal-component analysis of assessments, the only one of five factors that was related However, even when confronted with concrete physiological findings -or, rather, non-findings -the emotivist media (with a little help from the authors), in this case not a tabloid, but the New York Times, presented this research under the title "Heart-pounding art" (sic!) -despite the fact that in the entire article by Tröndle and Tschacher there is no mention of "emotion," (except heart rate and palmar sweat measurements). 33 This does not prevent the journalist from writing, in the first sentence, that the visitors are "emotionally affected," and that the solitary visitors, in the second sentence, "experience more emotion."
If this were reporting about some other branch of scholarship, it would be immediately and firmly challenged. Emotivism, however, as the all-purpose pseudoscholarly stance, apparently rules unchallenged.
Conclusion: Can visual art induce genuine emotions?
It seems clear from the preceding review that, in my opinion, traditionally The first of the three classes of artwork stimulus properties is psychophysical, with its most prominent member large size or physical grandeur, an attribute used painstakingly by artists and craftsmen since antiquity to honor gods and kings. 36 The present age of high technology and easy money has changed the methods and the themes. Installations, even those that skillfully utilize all three of the stimulus properties described above, are also unlikely to be powerful, versatile, and sophisticated enough to connect with the viewers' respective associative networks and induce genuine psychobiological emotions. It is not enough to shock -the spectator is always safe. And even though some of Hirst's works address profound issues, their execution is simultaneously too profane and too sterile to produce anything but disgust -and many psychobiologists, for good reason, do not consider disgust to be a genuine emotion, because it is a reflex-like visual, olfactory and gustatory response.
Nevertheless, there seem to be installations, such as the previously mentioned Olafur Eliasson's artificial sun, which combine aspects of all three stimulus properties so as to capture the quality of the sublime. In Aesthetic Trinity Theory, the prototypical (and independently defined) response to the sublime stimulus is aesthetic awe: a state that
should not be considered a fundamental psychobiological emotion but rather a mixture (even if primordial) of joy and fear. 37 Judging by the responses of many spectators at the Tate Modern, the artificial sun clearly produced aesthetic awe in them. The effect was evidently facilitated by, or even dependent on, the gigantic space of Turbine Hall.
Aesthetic Trinity Theory incorporates a tripartite hierarchy of aesthetic responses (physiological thrills or chills; being-moved; and the rarest, and most pronounced and memorable, aesthetic awe -the response to the sublime). 38 Aesthetic awe has been successfully used in a discussion of the effects of magnificent absolute music in exceptional performance settings. For various reasons that have been raised here, for visual art to have an emotional effect -though not on the fundamental emotions -one needs exposure to magnificent installations in exceptional performance settings.
NOTES

